Syrian civil war (52 Viewers)
- Thread starter ReBeL
- Start date
inside Hama, the city of fear and ghosts
On the pavements and at the roundabouts, there are sandbagged army encampments. As you pass, the soldiers follow you with the barrels of their rifles.
High above, on the old Byzantine citadel, the regime has set up sniper positions, so it can fire at will into the streets below.
Hama, a front line of the Syrian uprising, is a city of fear and ghosts.
For six weeks, it was in opposition hands. Then the regime sent in troops. Every farm track was blocked, every phone line cut. The internet was closed, the electricity turned off and even food supplies stopped.
From within the sealed city, reports of terror trickled out: of houses shelled by government tanks, of unarmed crowds cut down by machine guns, of 130 dead on the first day alone.
But after 10 days, Hama was saved for President Bashar al-Assad. And after three months, the regime feels confident enough to show it to a foreign journalist.
"The key thing we did was spreading the culture of love and co-operation with the people," said the governor, Anas el-Naem.
In his office, screens show CCTV pictures from around the city, just in case any further lack of love or co-operation should occur.
The shops are open. There is traffic, and there are people on the pavements. But a few hundred yards from the city centre, there is a large stretch of wasteland: the result of what happened last time Syrians challenged their government.
It used to be the Old City, a densely-populated residential district. But in 1982, after an army unit was ambushed there, Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad, bombed it from the air, attacked it with artillery and sent tanks to reduce it to rubble. The inhabitants were home at the time. At least 10,000 of them died, in what has been called "among the single deadliest acts by any Arab government against its own people."
They have put a few new things where the Old City once was: a police headquarters, a five-star hotel. But mostly it is still as the bulldozers left it. The Daily Telegraph asked the governor's PR, who was on the walk through, why it had not been built on. Was the regime ashamed? There was a long pause. "It's a different situation," he said.
The internet and TV are enough – probably – to stop another Old City happening this time.
But the memories fuel a deep anger that explains why, for all the regime's best efforts, Hama fights on.
On the edge of the destruction zone, one local resident said: "There is a great tension here in Hama. It's a special case.
There are demonstrations every Friday. Some people are being killed, and some are taken to prison."
A young man outside a shop said: "There is unrest here. The government hasn't done enough to satisfy people."
Customers in a café refused to talk. "It's an issue we don't like to discuss," said one man. "It's very dangerous."
All these interviews were done in the presence of government minders. None of them volunteered support for the regime.
Even Dr el Naem admits that the city is "not a hundred per cent under control, but ninety per cent."
He says there are around three attacks a week against the security forces, plus the Friday demonstrations; 14 were killed in Hama last weekend, according to opposition groups.
Hama is much more conservative than Damascus. Almost all the women are veiled.
Here, for the first time in Syria, The Telegraph saw an Assad picture that had been defaced. In the Al-Hader district, somebody had written in English on an advertising hoarding: "We are kill".
But the rest of it had been ripped down. I asked to speak to people in the opposition areas of al-Qujour and al-Hamidiyah. But though we drove through them, at speed, we didn't stop. It wasn't safe, they said.
Dr el Naem dismissed the Arab League's call for the regime to pull tanks off the streets. "They ask us to withdraw the army without offering any solution for the armed gangs," he said.
The road from Damascus to Hama goes around the even more restive city of Homs, where journalists are not allowed to venture. On that road, as darkness fell, we passed a line of perhaps thirty tanks, grinding slowly towards Homs.
Dr el Naem says that the death toll among the security forces is now starting to surpass that of the protesters.
He may, in fact, be right. Last weekend, across the country, at least 35 members of the army and police died. As the regime reaps what it has sown, what's happening in this part of Syria looks increasingly like armed conflict.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...-inside-Hama-the-city-of-fear-and-ghosts.html
On the pavements and at the roundabouts, there are sandbagged army encampments. As you pass, the soldiers follow you with the barrels of their rifles.
High above, on the old Byzantine citadel, the regime has set up sniper positions, so it can fire at will into the streets below.
Hama, a front line of the Syrian uprising, is a city of fear and ghosts.
For six weeks, it was in opposition hands. Then the regime sent in troops. Every farm track was blocked, every phone line cut. The internet was closed, the electricity turned off and even food supplies stopped.
From within the sealed city, reports of terror trickled out: of houses shelled by government tanks, of unarmed crowds cut down by machine guns, of 130 dead on the first day alone.
But after 10 days, Hama was saved for President Bashar al-Assad. And after three months, the regime feels confident enough to show it to a foreign journalist.
"The key thing we did was spreading the culture of love and co-operation with the people," said the governor, Anas el-Naem.
In his office, screens show CCTV pictures from around the city, just in case any further lack of love or co-operation should occur.
The shops are open. There is traffic, and there are people on the pavements. But a few hundred yards from the city centre, there is a large stretch of wasteland: the result of what happened last time Syrians challenged their government.
It used to be the Old City, a densely-populated residential district. But in 1982, after an army unit was ambushed there, Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad, bombed it from the air, attacked it with artillery and sent tanks to reduce it to rubble. The inhabitants were home at the time. At least 10,000 of them died, in what has been called "among the single deadliest acts by any Arab government against its own people."
They have put a few new things where the Old City once was: a police headquarters, a five-star hotel. But mostly it is still as the bulldozers left it. The Daily Telegraph asked the governor's PR, who was on the walk through, why it had not been built on. Was the regime ashamed? There was a long pause. "It's a different situation," he said.
The internet and TV are enough – probably – to stop another Old City happening this time.
But the memories fuel a deep anger that explains why, for all the regime's best efforts, Hama fights on.
On the edge of the destruction zone, one local resident said: "There is a great tension here in Hama. It's a special case.
There are demonstrations every Friday. Some people are being killed, and some are taken to prison."
A young man outside a shop said: "There is unrest here. The government hasn't done enough to satisfy people."
Customers in a café refused to talk. "It's an issue we don't like to discuss," said one man. "It's very dangerous."
All these interviews were done in the presence of government minders. None of them volunteered support for the regime.
Even Dr el Naem admits that the city is "not a hundred per cent under control, but ninety per cent."
He says there are around three attacks a week against the security forces, plus the Friday demonstrations; 14 were killed in Hama last weekend, according to opposition groups.
Hama is much more conservative than Damascus. Almost all the women are veiled.
Here, for the first time in Syria, The Telegraph saw an Assad picture that had been defaced. In the Al-Hader district, somebody had written in English on an advertising hoarding: "We are kill".
But the rest of it had been ripped down. I asked to speak to people in the opposition areas of al-Qujour and al-Hamidiyah. But though we drove through them, at speed, we didn't stop. It wasn't safe, they said.
Dr el Naem dismissed the Arab League's call for the regime to pull tanks off the streets. "They ask us to withdraw the army without offering any solution for the armed gangs," he said.
The road from Damascus to Hama goes around the even more restive city of Homs, where journalists are not allowed to venture. On that road, as darkness fell, we passed a line of perhaps thirty tanks, grinding slowly towards Homs.
Dr el Naem says that the death toll among the security forces is now starting to surpass that of the protesters.
He may, in fact, be right. Last weekend, across the country, at least 35 members of the army and police died. As the regime reaps what it has sown, what's happening in this part of Syria looks increasingly like armed conflict.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...-inside-Hama-the-city-of-fear-and-ghosts.html
Erdoğan says Syria’s ‘glorious resistance’ will succeed
In yet another show of support for the opponents of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said he believes the opposition will be successful in their “glorious” resistance to the ongoing government crackdown.
Speaking during his Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) parliamentary group meeting on Tuesday, Erdoğan continued his severe criticisms of the Syrian administration. “We had a friendship that began nine years ago but Syria failed to appreciate this. They [Syrian rulers] did not pay heed to our warnings. … But we cannot remain silent in the face of this process. We will continue to display the necessary stance. I believe that the Syrian people will be successful in their glorious resistance,” he said.
Turkey, once a close ally of the Syrian president, has gradually toughened its criticism of the Syrian regime for its brutal crackdown on anti-regime protests. Last month, Erdoğan slammed Assad, suggesting that Syria would be the next country on the Arab Spring list and that Assad would eventually be ousted by his own people.
“Those who repress their own people in Syria will not survive. The time of autocracies is over. Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people is coming,” Erdoğan also said in September in Libya while addressing the Libyan people.
Assad has shrugged off broad international condemnation and calls for him to step down, insisting that armed gangs and thugs are behind the violence, not true reform-seekers.
The Turkish prime minister has reiterated on many occasions that what happens in Syria is an “internal affair” for Turkey, not an issue of foreign policy, given the 850-kilometer-long border between the two countries and deep cultural and historical ties.
On Tuesday Erdoğan also voiced his belief that the Syrians who have been killed by pro-Assad forces are martyrs.
“The killing of one person is like the killing of all humanity, but unfortunately there is an administration [in Syria] that massacres and kills people, making them martyrs. This is an administration that relies on force. This is not an administration which depends on the nation’s will,” he said.
At the same meeting, the prime minister also praised Turkey for showing an example of solidarity for the entire world to see in the aftermath of a powerful earthquake that hit eastern province of Van on Oct. 23, killing more than 600 people.
He said all 80 provinces of Turkey mobilized to extend a helping hand to the quake victims. Erdoğan added: “We have mobilized all our means for the construction of temporary shelters and permanent accommodation. We are healing the wounds very rapidly. With its population of 74 million, Turkey displayed a solidarity [for Van] which sets as an example to the world.” Erdoğan also focused on a letter Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu sent him recently regarding an alleged corruption case in Kayseri.
In late 2010 Kılıçdaroğlu alleged that the Kayseri Municipality, the Kayseri Governor’s Office and the Kayseri Police Department were all involved in corruption. In a speech made in Parliament during which he criticized the government’s management of the economy and the 2011 budget, Kılıçdaroğlu produced a file concerning allegations of corruption in Kayseri province going back to 2007.
Kayseri Mayor Mehmet Özhaseki is from the AK Party.
Erdoğan said Kılıçdaroğlu has so far failed to back up his allegations regarding the alleged corruption case in Kayseri and that he tries to defame the government by bringing the issue back to the agenda over and over again. The prime minister said he would write a detailed response to the CHP leader.
In yet another show of support for the opponents of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said he believes the opposition will be successful in their “glorious” resistance to the ongoing government crackdown.
Speaking during his Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) parliamentary group meeting on Tuesday, Erdoğan continued his severe criticisms of the Syrian administration. “We had a friendship that began nine years ago but Syria failed to appreciate this. They [Syrian rulers] did not pay heed to our warnings. … But we cannot remain silent in the face of this process. We will continue to display the necessary stance. I believe that the Syrian people will be successful in their glorious resistance,” he said.
Turkey, once a close ally of the Syrian president, has gradually toughened its criticism of the Syrian regime for its brutal crackdown on anti-regime protests. Last month, Erdoğan slammed Assad, suggesting that Syria would be the next country on the Arab Spring list and that Assad would eventually be ousted by his own people.
“Those who repress their own people in Syria will not survive. The time of autocracies is over. Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people is coming,” Erdoğan also said in September in Libya while addressing the Libyan people.
Assad has shrugged off broad international condemnation and calls for him to step down, insisting that armed gangs and thugs are behind the violence, not true reform-seekers.
The Turkish prime minister has reiterated on many occasions that what happens in Syria is an “internal affair” for Turkey, not an issue of foreign policy, given the 850-kilometer-long border between the two countries and deep cultural and historical ties.
On Tuesday Erdoğan also voiced his belief that the Syrians who have been killed by pro-Assad forces are martyrs.
“The killing of one person is like the killing of all humanity, but unfortunately there is an administration [in Syria] that massacres and kills people, making them martyrs. This is an administration that relies on force. This is not an administration which depends on the nation’s will,” he said.
At the same meeting, the prime minister also praised Turkey for showing an example of solidarity for the entire world to see in the aftermath of a powerful earthquake that hit eastern province of Van on Oct. 23, killing more than 600 people.
He said all 80 provinces of Turkey mobilized to extend a helping hand to the quake victims. Erdoğan added: “We have mobilized all our means for the construction of temporary shelters and permanent accommodation. We are healing the wounds very rapidly. With its population of 74 million, Turkey displayed a solidarity [for Van] which sets as an example to the world.” Erdoğan also focused on a letter Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu sent him recently regarding an alleged corruption case in Kayseri.
In late 2010 Kılıçdaroğlu alleged that the Kayseri Municipality, the Kayseri Governor’s Office and the Kayseri Police Department were all involved in corruption. In a speech made in Parliament during which he criticized the government’s management of the economy and the 2011 budget, Kılıçdaroğlu produced a file concerning allegations of corruption in Kayseri province going back to 2007.
Kayseri Mayor Mehmet Özhaseki is from the AK Party.
Erdoğan said Kılıçdaroğlu has so far failed to back up his allegations regarding the alleged corruption case in Kayseri and that he tries to defame the government by bringing the issue back to the agenda over and over again. The prime minister said he would write a detailed response to the CHP leader.
I really don't see this regime falling down.
Too many reasons why Westerns aren't pushing more for the breakout of this regime and when you have China, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah supporting you financially, military, politically you're not gonna fall down easy.
Also, I'm yet to see a green American light like the one we saw in Egypt when Obama officially asked Mubarak to step down and the one in Libya having in mind that what's happening in Syria is much worse than what happened in Libya or Egypt, actually they can't even be compared.
Too many reasons why Westerns aren't pushing more for the breakout of this regime and when you have China, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah supporting you financially, military, politically you're not gonna fall down easy.
Also, I'm yet to see a green American light like the one we saw in Egypt when Obama officially asked Mubarak to step down and the one in Libya having in mind that what's happening in Syria is much worse than what happened in Libya or Egypt, actually they can't even be compared.
Syria and Iran: the great game
Regime change in Syria is a strategic prize that outstrips Libya – which is why Saudi Arabia and the west are playing their part
guardian.co.uk, Friday 4 November 2011 17.15 GMT
This summer a senior Saudi official told John Hannah, Dick Cheney's former chief of staff, that from the outset of the upheaval in Syria, the king has believed that regime change would be highly beneficial to Saudi interests: "The king knows that other than the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself, nothing would weaken Iran more than losing Syria."
This is today's "great game" – losing Syria. And this is how it is played: set up a hurried transitional council as sole representative of the Syrian people, irrespective of whether it has any real legs inside Syria; feed in armed insurgents from neighbouring states; impose sanctions that will hurt the middle classes; mount a media campaign to denigrate any Syrian efforts at reform; try to instigate divisions within the army and the elite; and ultimately President Assad will fall – so its initiators insist.
Europeans, Americans and certain Gulf states may see the Syria "game" as the logical successor to the supposedly successful Libya game in moulding the Arab awakening towards a western cultural paradigm. In terms of regional politics however, Syria is strategically more valuable, and Iran knows this. Iran has said that it will respond to any external intervention in Syria.
It is already no "game", as the many killed by both sides attests to. The radical armed elements being used in Syria as auxiliaries to depose Assad run counter to the prospect of any outcome emerging within the western paradigm. These groups may well have a bloody and very undemocratic agenda of their own. I warned of this danger in connection to Afghanistan in the 80s: some of the Afghan mujahideen had real roots in the community, I suggested, but others posed a severe danger to people. A kindly American politician at the time placed his arm around my shoulder and told me not to worry: these were the people "kicking Soviet ass". We chose to look the other way because kicking the Soviets played well to US domestic needs. Today Europe looks the other way, refusing to consider who Syria's combat-experienced insurgents taking such a toll of Syrian security forces truly are, because losing Assad and confronting Iran plays so well, particularly at a time of domestic difficulty.
Fortunately, the tactics in Syria, in spite of heavy investment, seem to be failing. Most people in the region believe that if Syria is pushed further into civil conflict the result will be sectarian violence in Lebanon, Iraq and more widely too. The notion that such conflict will throw up a stable, let alone western-style, democracy, is fanciful at best, an act of supreme callousness at worst.
The origins of the "lose Assad" operation preceded the Arab awakening: they reach back to Israel's failure in its 2006 war to seriously damage Hezbollah, and the post-conflict US assessment that it was Syria that represented Hezbollah's achilles heel – as the vulnerable conduit linking Hezbollah to Iran. US officials speculated as to what might be done to block this vital corridor, but it was Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia who surprised them by saying that the solution was to harness Islamic forces. The Americans were intrigued, but could not deal with such people. Leave that to me, Bandar retorted. Hannah noted that "Bandar working without reference to US interests is clearly cause for concern. But Bandar working as a partner … against a common Iranian enemy is a major strategic asset." Bandar got the job.
Hypothetical planning, however, only became concrete action this year, with the overthrow of Egypt's President Mubarak. Suddenly Israel seemed vulnerable, and a weakened Syria, mired in troubles, had heightened strategic allure. In parallel, Qatar had stepped to the fore. Azmi Bishara, a pan-Arabist who resigned from the Israeli Knesset and self-exiled to Doha, was according to some local reports involved in a scheme in which al-Jazeera would not just report revolution, but instantiate it for the region – or at least this is what was believed in Doha in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. Qatar, however, was not merely trying to leverage human suffering into an international intervention, but was also – as in Libya – directly involved as a key operational patron of the opposition.
The next stages were to draw France's President Sarkozy – the arch-promoter of the Benghazi transitional council model that had turned Nato into an instrument of regime change – into the team. Barack Obama followed by helping to persuade Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan – already piqued at Assad – to play the transitional council part on Syria's border, and lend his legitimacy to the "resistance". Both of the latter components, however, are not without challenges from their own security arms, who are sceptical of the efficacy of the transitional council model, and opposed to military intervention. Even Bandar is not without challenges: he has no political umbrella from the king, and others in the family are playing other Islamist cards to different ends. Iran, Iraq and Algeria – and occasionally Egypt – co-operate to frustrate Gulf manoeuvres against Syria at the Arab League. The transitional council model, which in Libya has displayed the weakness of leveraging just one faction as the government-in-waiting, is more starkly defective in Syria. Syria's opposition council, put together by Turkey, France and Qatar, is caught out by the fact that the Syrian security structures have remained near rock solid through seven months – defections have been negligible – and Assad's popular support base are intact. Only external intervention could change that equation, but for the opposition to call for it would be political suicide, and they know it.
The internal opposition gathering in Istanbul demanded a statement refusing external intervention and armed action, but the Syrian national council was announced even before the intra-opposition talks had reached any agreement – such was the hurry on the part of external parties.
The external opposition continues to fudge its stance on external intervention, and with good reason: the internal opposition rejects it. This is the flaw to the model – for the majority in Syria deeply oppose external intervention, fearing civil conflict. Hence Syrians face a long period of externally mounted insurgency, siege and international attrition. Both sides will pay in blood.
But the real danger, as Hannah himself noted, is that the Saudis might "once again fire up the old Sunni jihadist network and point it in the general direction of Shiite Iran", which puts Syria first in line. In fact, that is exactly what is happening, but the west, as before in Afghanistan, prefers not to notice – so long as the drama plays well to western audiences.
As Foreign Affairs reported last month, Saudi and its Gulf allies are firing up the radical Salafists (fundamentalist Sunnis), not only to weaken Iran, but to do what they see is necessary to survive – to disrupt and emasculate the awakenings that threaten absolute monarchism. This is happening in Syria, Libya, Egypt Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
This Islamically assertive, literalist orientation of Islam may be generally viewed as nonpolitical and pliable, but history is far from comforting. If you tell people often enough that they can be king-makers and throw buckets of money at them, do not be surprised if they metamorphose – yet again – into something very political. It may take some months, but the fruits of this new attempt to use radical forces for western ends will yet again backfire. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, recently warned that the Hillary Clinton-devised response to the Arab awakening, of implanting western paradigms, by force if necessary, into the void of fallen regimes, will be seen as a "cultural war on Islam", and will sow the seeds of a further round of radicalisation.
One of the sad paradoxes is the undercutting of moderate Sunnis, who now find themselves caught between the rock of being seen as a western tool, and the hard place of radical Sunni Salafists waiting for the opportunity to displace them and to dismantle the state. What a strange world: Europe and the US think it is OK to "use" precisely those Islamists (including al-Qaida) who absolutely do not believe in western-style democracy in order to bring it about. But then, why not just look the other way and gain the benefit of the public enjoying Assad's kicking?
Regime change in Syria is a strategic prize that outstrips Libya – which is why Saudi Arabia and the west are playing their part
guardian.co.uk, Friday 4 November 2011 17.15 GMT
This summer a senior Saudi official told John Hannah, Dick Cheney's former chief of staff, that from the outset of the upheaval in Syria, the king has believed that regime change would be highly beneficial to Saudi interests: "The king knows that other than the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself, nothing would weaken Iran more than losing Syria."
This is today's "great game" – losing Syria. And this is how it is played: set up a hurried transitional council as sole representative of the Syrian people, irrespective of whether it has any real legs inside Syria; feed in armed insurgents from neighbouring states; impose sanctions that will hurt the middle classes; mount a media campaign to denigrate any Syrian efforts at reform; try to instigate divisions within the army and the elite; and ultimately President Assad will fall – so its initiators insist.
Europeans, Americans and certain Gulf states may see the Syria "game" as the logical successor to the supposedly successful Libya game in moulding the Arab awakening towards a western cultural paradigm. In terms of regional politics however, Syria is strategically more valuable, and Iran knows this. Iran has said that it will respond to any external intervention in Syria.
It is already no "game", as the many killed by both sides attests to. The radical armed elements being used in Syria as auxiliaries to depose Assad run counter to the prospect of any outcome emerging within the western paradigm. These groups may well have a bloody and very undemocratic agenda of their own. I warned of this danger in connection to Afghanistan in the 80s: some of the Afghan mujahideen had real roots in the community, I suggested, but others posed a severe danger to people. A kindly American politician at the time placed his arm around my shoulder and told me not to worry: these were the people "kicking Soviet ass". We chose to look the other way because kicking the Soviets played well to US domestic needs. Today Europe looks the other way, refusing to consider who Syria's combat-experienced insurgents taking such a toll of Syrian security forces truly are, because losing Assad and confronting Iran plays so well, particularly at a time of domestic difficulty.
Fortunately, the tactics in Syria, in spite of heavy investment, seem to be failing. Most people in the region believe that if Syria is pushed further into civil conflict the result will be sectarian violence in Lebanon, Iraq and more widely too. The notion that such conflict will throw up a stable, let alone western-style, democracy, is fanciful at best, an act of supreme callousness at worst.
The origins of the "lose Assad" operation preceded the Arab awakening: they reach back to Israel's failure in its 2006 war to seriously damage Hezbollah, and the post-conflict US assessment that it was Syria that represented Hezbollah's achilles heel – as the vulnerable conduit linking Hezbollah to Iran. US officials speculated as to what might be done to block this vital corridor, but it was Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia who surprised them by saying that the solution was to harness Islamic forces. The Americans were intrigued, but could not deal with such people. Leave that to me, Bandar retorted. Hannah noted that "Bandar working without reference to US interests is clearly cause for concern. But Bandar working as a partner … against a common Iranian enemy is a major strategic asset." Bandar got the job.
Hypothetical planning, however, only became concrete action this year, with the overthrow of Egypt's President Mubarak. Suddenly Israel seemed vulnerable, and a weakened Syria, mired in troubles, had heightened strategic allure. In parallel, Qatar had stepped to the fore. Azmi Bishara, a pan-Arabist who resigned from the Israeli Knesset and self-exiled to Doha, was according to some local reports involved in a scheme in which al-Jazeera would not just report revolution, but instantiate it for the region – or at least this is what was believed in Doha in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. Qatar, however, was not merely trying to leverage human suffering into an international intervention, but was also – as in Libya – directly involved as a key operational patron of the opposition.
The next stages were to draw France's President Sarkozy – the arch-promoter of the Benghazi transitional council model that had turned Nato into an instrument of regime change – into the team. Barack Obama followed by helping to persuade Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan – already piqued at Assad – to play the transitional council part on Syria's border, and lend his legitimacy to the "resistance". Both of the latter components, however, are not without challenges from their own security arms, who are sceptical of the efficacy of the transitional council model, and opposed to military intervention. Even Bandar is not without challenges: he has no political umbrella from the king, and others in the family are playing other Islamist cards to different ends. Iran, Iraq and Algeria – and occasionally Egypt – co-operate to frustrate Gulf manoeuvres against Syria at the Arab League. The transitional council model, which in Libya has displayed the weakness of leveraging just one faction as the government-in-waiting, is more starkly defective in Syria. Syria's opposition council, put together by Turkey, France and Qatar, is caught out by the fact that the Syrian security structures have remained near rock solid through seven months – defections have been negligible – and Assad's popular support base are intact. Only external intervention could change that equation, but for the opposition to call for it would be political suicide, and they know it.
The internal opposition gathering in Istanbul demanded a statement refusing external intervention and armed action, but the Syrian national council was announced even before the intra-opposition talks had reached any agreement – such was the hurry on the part of external parties.
The external opposition continues to fudge its stance on external intervention, and with good reason: the internal opposition rejects it. This is the flaw to the model – for the majority in Syria deeply oppose external intervention, fearing civil conflict. Hence Syrians face a long period of externally mounted insurgency, siege and international attrition. Both sides will pay in blood.
But the real danger, as Hannah himself noted, is that the Saudis might "once again fire up the old Sunni jihadist network and point it in the general direction of Shiite Iran", which puts Syria first in line. In fact, that is exactly what is happening, but the west, as before in Afghanistan, prefers not to notice – so long as the drama plays well to western audiences.
As Foreign Affairs reported last month, Saudi and its Gulf allies are firing up the radical Salafists (fundamentalist Sunnis), not only to weaken Iran, but to do what they see is necessary to survive – to disrupt and emasculate the awakenings that threaten absolute monarchism. This is happening in Syria, Libya, Egypt Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
This Islamically assertive, literalist orientation of Islam may be generally viewed as nonpolitical and pliable, but history is far from comforting. If you tell people often enough that they can be king-makers and throw buckets of money at them, do not be surprised if they metamorphose – yet again – into something very political. It may take some months, but the fruits of this new attempt to use radical forces for western ends will yet again backfire. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, recently warned that the Hillary Clinton-devised response to the Arab awakening, of implanting western paradigms, by force if necessary, into the void of fallen regimes, will be seen as a "cultural war on Islam", and will sow the seeds of a further round of radicalisation.
One of the sad paradoxes is the undercutting of moderate Sunnis, who now find themselves caught between the rock of being seen as a western tool, and the hard place of radical Sunni Salafists waiting for the opportunity to displace them and to dismantle the state. What a strange world: Europe and the US think it is OK to "use" precisely those Islamists (including al-Qaida) who absolutely do not believe in western-style democracy in order to bring it about. But then, why not just look the other way and gain the benefit of the public enjoying Assad's kicking?