Ghost sponsorship, FIGC accomplice, mafia links: Inter Milan at the heart of the biggest scandal since Calciopoli!
A plunge into the darkness of Inter Milan. In the aftermath of a crushing defeat against PSG, and as Simone Inzaghi prepares to leave the bench, a confidential report casts an even darker shadow over the situation. It highlights opaque financial management, dubious sponsors, worrying links with certain ultras, and alleged institutional interference. An explosive cocktail that could shake an entire system—and awaken the ghosts of Calciopoli.
By
Valentin Feuillette - 03/06 - 14:16
6 min.
@Maxppp
After the on-field collapse, the off-field abyss: Inter Milan is undoubtedly going through the worst week in its recent history. Brutal humiliation in the Champions League against PSG, the imminent departure of Simone Inzaghi, coach of a historic season, and now, an explosive report that sheds a chilling light on the club's finances: Inter Milan is going through a dark period. A confidential document, written by a financial advisor operating in the City of London, reveals financial management mechanisms deemed irregular, a worrying proximity to influential groups, and widespread institutional interference. Between fictitious sponsorships, creative accounting, and supposed intervention by the FIGC to avoid exclusion from the championship, it is an entire system that seems to have allowed the Nerazzurri club to remain at the top despite an economic reality that, according to the report, should have led to liquidation, exclusion from
Serie A , or even relegation to lower divisions. This confidential report, written by a London banker—an advisor to a group interested in buying Inter Milan—sheds a harsh light on the club's financial practices during the early years of Suning's presidency (2016-2019). Published by
the Italian website Affaritaliani.it and also relayed in
a television report by Rai , the document calls into question the solidity and legitimacy of some of the revenue recorded at the time, particularly that linked to Asian sponsors.
Nearly 300 million euros from China
Upon taking over the club in 2016, the Chinese group Suning established a network of "regional sponsors" that generated nearly €300 million in revenue over three seasons (2016-2019). This figure represents 27% of Inter's total revenue over this period, according to the report. Of this, €131.4 million came from an intra-Suning group contract, and another €165.6 million from third-party partners, described as "dubious" by the author of the analysis. The revenue from these contracts, often temporary and difficult to trace, is presented as leverage to artificially bolster the club's accounts and meet UEFA's Financial Fair Play requirements. As a reminder, Inter was sanctioned by the European governing body in 2015 for non-compliance with economic rules, which led to a settlement agreement requiring a return to balance by 2019. Under Suning's presidency, the club's expenses increased sharply. Player and staff costs rose from €124 million in 2016 to €192 million in 2019, and other operating expenses jumped from €211 million to over €310 million over the same period.
In this context, traditional revenues (TV rights, ticket sales) are not enough to cover the deficit. The only significant and rapid room for maneuver lies in commercial and sponsorship contracts, particularly those signed with Chinese companies. Among the partners cited are FullShare Holding (tourism sector), King Down Investment (online travel), iMedia (sports marketing), as well as a public limited company that paid a €10 million entry fee and an annual contract worth €25 million to promote the Inter brand in Southeast Asia. According to the report, some of these companies have no clear connection to football, and several have never published public financial information. Before Suning's arrival, Inter's core revenue (excluding transfer gains) was around €176 million to €186 million per season. Three years later, the club has seen its revenues increase by 46%, mainly thanks to these Asian partnerships, which have brought in €297 million out of a total of €651.5 million. This is a spectacular increase, but one marked by numerous gray areas regarding traceability, the true economic nature of sponsors, and their independence from the owner.
Rapid but questionable growth
Beyond the atypical revenue generated through Chinese sponsors, the analysis report highlights a broader set of structural dysfunctions surrounding Inter Milan. It points to a precarious financial situation, questionable management practices, and alleged institutional interventions that allegedly contributed to keeping the club operating despite a balance sheet deemed unsustainable. The document refers to a company in a negative capital position, which, according to Italian standards, should have been subject to liquidation proceedings. This assertion is based in particular on the progressive deterioration of the club's equity and debt levels deemed incompatible with going concern. The artificial generation of liquidity through "phantom sponsorships" and contracts without economic logic is denounced as a mechanism for circumventing the accounting standards and financial management rules imposed by the FIGC and UEFA. According to the report, pressure was allegedly exerted on COVISOC, the financial monitoring body for Italian professional football (the Italian equivalent of the DNCG in France), to prevent Inter Milan's exclusion from Serie A. A former member of this body reportedly denounced deliberate lack of control following external interventions.
According to the documents, the FIGC allegedly implemented
ad hoc regulations that favored the Lombard club, in a context where other clubs have been sanctioned for similar or lesser offenses. The report also highlights a lack of transparency regarding the club's ultimate shareholders, as well as chains of control passing through offshore jurisdictions, including the blacklisted Cayman Islands. The situation was publicly commented on by Sports Minister Andrea Abodi, who called for "total transparency, like glass," directly linking the alleged failings to the need to commission COVISOC. Part of the report focuses on Giuseppe Marotta, Inter's current general manager. He is mentioned for direct negotiations with the club's ultras groups, especially during times of crisis. Phrases like "Marotta gives in to pressure" or "resolution thanks to Marotta" are used to describe his mediation in internal tensions. The analysis draws parallels with Marotta's time at Juventus, mentioning regular meetings with figures linked to organized crime in private places, without this leading to official investigations. No judicial involvement is confirmed, but the recurrence of these contacts is noted.
The report notes a contrast between the public recognition bestowed upon the club—such as the Ambrogino d'Oro awarded by Milan mayor Giuseppe Sala, or the Etoile's victory—and the ongoing investigations into links with certain ultras groups. The timing of certain public presentations, notably that of lawyer Ignazio La Russa alongside journalist Fabrizio Biasin, a few days after the ultras affair broke, is also highlighted as significant. Finally, president Steven Zhang is described as physically absent from key procedures, unable to travel due to the lack of a passport, fueling questions about the club's operational governance. What emerges from the report goes far beyond a simple accounting irregularity. It outlines a system of financial, political, and institutional collusion that allegedly allowed a giant of Italian football to flout the rules without facing the consequences. If confirmed, this would simply be the biggest scandal in Italian football since Calciopoli in 2006 and the Parmalat financial crash in 2003. The scale of the accusations, the alleged role of the FIGC and COVISOC, the nature of the injected revenue, the offshore networks, and the political complacency could shake not only Inter, but the integrity of the entire Italian football system.