President Clinton issued a classified directive in June 1995, Presidential
Decision Directive 39, which said that the United States should "deter, defeat
and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our
citizens."The directive called terrorism both a matter of national security and
a crime, and it assigned responsibilities to various agencies.Alarmed by the incident
in Tokyo, President Clinton made it the very highest priority for his own
staff and for all agencies to prepare to detect and respond to terrorism that
involved chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.101
During 1995 and 1996, President Clinton devoted considerable time to
seeking cooperation from other nations in denying sanctuary to terrorists. He
proposed significantly larger budgets for the FBI, with much of the increase
designated for counterterrorism. For the CIA, he essentially stopped cutting
allocations and supported requests for supplemental funds for counterterrorism.
102
When announcing his new national security team after being reelected in
1996, President Clinton mentioned terrorism first in a list of several challenges
facing the country.In 1998, after Bin Ladin’s fatwa and other alarms, President
Clinton accepted a proposal from his national security advisor, Samuel
"Sandy" Berger, and gave Clarke a new position as national coordinator for
security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism. He issued two Presidential
Decision Directives, numbers 62 and 63, that built on the assignments
to agencies that had been made in Presidential Decision Directive 39; laid out
ten program areas for counterterrorism.
Although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate had warned of a new type
of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states
(Saudi Hezbollah acting for Iran against Khobar Towers) or as domestic criminals
(Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City).As we pointed out in chapter 3,
the White House is not a natural locus for program management.Hence, government
efforts to cope with terrorism were essentially the work of individual
agencies.
President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives
in 1995 (no. 39) and May 1998 (no. 62) reiterated that terrorism was a national
security problem, not just a law enforcement issue.They reinforced the authority
of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as
foreign counterterrorism efforts, through Richard Clarke and his interagency
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Spotlighting new concerns about
unconventional attacks, these directives assigned tasks to lead agencies but did
not differentiate types of terrorist threats.Thus,while Clarke might prod or push
agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Department,
The Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department. The efforts of these
Agencies were sometimes energetic and sometimes effective. Terrorist plots were
Disrupted and individual terrorists were captured. But the United States did not,
Before 9/11, adopt as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda.